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ANTITRUST ANALYSIS OF NOPEC
LEGISLATION
Harry First
Darren Bush*
This Article analyzes the proposed "No Oil Producing and
Exporting Cartels Act of 2019" (NOPEC). This legislation, which
was introduced in the United States Senate and House of
Representatives, addresses the antitrust issues involved in suing
the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC),
their member states and their state owned oil companies (SOEs),
other states and their SOEs, and private companies for their
participation in an international cartel that has long been
involved in regulating the production and distribution of oil and
other petroleum products.'
It is our view that this proposed legislation provides a
relatively moderate approach to applying U.S. antitrust law to the
activities of the likely participants in this cartel. The legislation
does not completely cure all the legal problems, but it does remove
substantial roadblocks that have allowed this cartel to operate in
disregard of U.S. antitrust law.
* The authors are, respectively, Charles L. Denison Professor of Law, New
York University School of Law, and Leonard B. Rosenberg Professor of
Law, University of Houston Law Center. This Article was originally
commissioned as a White Paper by Securing America's Future Energy
(SAFE), but the views expressed in the Article are solely those of the
authors. The authors note that, along with John J. Flynn, they co-wrote an
op-ed in the Los Angeles Times in 2008 on the subject. See John J. Flynn
et. al., Sue OPEC, LA Times, available at
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2008-jun-1 9-oe-firstl9-story.html.
1 The NOPEC bill version analyzed in this article is attached as
Appendix A.
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INTRODUCTION
Ever since OPEC was formed in 1960, there have been
concerns about whether the coordinated efforts of major oil
producing countries would affect the markets for oil and other
petroleum products in the same way as other cartels affect their
markets-by restricting output and raising price above the
competitive level-thereby harming consumers. These concerns
have only grown over time, as more countries joined OPEC and
as OPEC became an effective vehicle for controlling the output of
what would otherwise have been competing oil producers.
U.S. antitrust law has always taken a dim view of price
fixing cartels. Condemned as illegal from the very earliest days of
the antitrust laws in the 19th century, price fixing was formally
declared to be "per se" unlawful more than seventy-five years ago.
This condemnation has been applied not just to domestic cartels,
but to international cartels as well. The United States
Department of Justice ("DOJ") has pursued a policy of
prosecuting international cartels since the late 1930s, and with
particular vigor in the 2 1st century. Justice Scalia expressed this
policy view succinctly, when he wrote for the Supreme Court in
2004 that collusion with regard to price is "the supreme evil of
antitrust." 2
Despite this widely held view, the DOJ has not brought an
antitrust suit against OPEC, its members, or other firms or
countries involved in the oil cartel. Private parties have
attempted to do so, but their suits have failed. Courts have
applied several substantive law doctrines-comity, Act of State,
and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act-as well as rules on
service of process under the Federal Rules of Civil procedure, to
turn away the four private cases that have been filed.
NOPEC is directed at removing the substantive defenses
that have blocked the private party litigation and that might
block litigation filed by the DOJ. The bill removes those blocks,
although an issue might remain if the DOJ brings a criminal
prosecution. The bill does not address the procedural issue of
service of process. Depending on how the litigation is framed, the
service of process issue could affect the outcome of the litigation.
NOPEC gives the DOJ the exclusive right to enforce
NOPEC. This means the DOJ would retain its discretion as to
2 Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S.
398, 408 (2004).
Vol. 32:184
whether to prosecute criminally or to sue civilly. It also retains its
discretion to take no action, a decision that would not be subject
to any legal review.
Applying the antitrust laws to participants in the
international oil cartel would be consistent with long-standing
antitrust enforcement policy. It is difficult to see why, as an
antitrust matter, oil should be treated differently than potash,
lysine, vitamins, airline transportation, computer chips, auto
parts, or any of the other diverse international industries whose
price fixing activities have been the subject of antitrust litigation
when consumers and businesses in the United States have been
harmed.
In the past, foreign countries have not always been happy
about the United States applying its antitrust laws to cartels
formed or operated in their countries. Early efforts to resist that
enforcement, however, have largely given way to foreign
countries embracing competition, engaging in law enforcement
against international cartels, and even accepting the
imprisonment of their nationals in U.S. jails. While asymmetric
retaliation from foreign countries outside the competition law
system is certainly possible, there is no history of such retaliation
against U.S. antitrust enforcement, even in the context of the
private litigation brought directly against OPEC and state-owned
oil companies. Consequently, concerns with retaliation as a result
of antitrust action by the United States are misplaced.
The rationale for NOPEC is straightforward: the DOJ
should have the opportunity to treat the oil cartel as it treats all
others. The DOJ will still be required to choose the proper
defendants and to prove the parties agreed to fix prices or output
(which will require investigation, including discovery of
documents). The DOJ would also clearly need to take account of
the foreign policy implications of such litigation, a matter that
would require consultation with other departments within the
Executive Branch, which might include the President.
NOPEC reserves the decision to the DOJ's discretion as to
whether to file suit. NOPEC is an enabling measure. The DOJ
would still retain prosecutorial discretion in determining whether
to bring suit.
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POTENTIAL PARTIES AND THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION
A. OPEC and the Oil Cartel
OPEC is an organization comprised of 17 member
countries.3 The principal aim of OPEC is "the coordination and
unification of the petroleum policies of Member Countries and
the determination of the best means for safeguarding their
interests, individually and collectively," including the
"stabilization" of international oil prices.4
OPEC wields control over oil markets in a variety of ways
and in a variety of instances throughout its history. The most
notable example occurred in the 1970s during the Arab-Israeli
War. OPEC used its market power to punish the U.S. for its
support of Israel. As a result, oil prices surged and spot shortages
of gasoline occurred throughout the United States.
OPEC has not always exercised its market power to
increase prices. It is widely believed in the American oil industry
that OPEC's move in late 2014 to allow market prices for oil to
fall drastically was designed to curtail expansion of shale oil
production in North America.5 From 2015 to 2018, over 160
North American exploration and production companies filed for
bankruptcy, Exxon Mobil and Chevron's stocks underperformed,
and over 230,000 U.S. oil workers lost their jobs.6
3 Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela created OPEC in
1960. These "Founding" members eventually would be joined by other "full"
members. Member countries currently include: Algeria, Angola, Ecuador,
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, the Republic of
the Congo, Saudi Arabia (the de facto leader), United Arab Emirates, and
Venezuela. Qatar exited OPEC in late 2018 both to focus on liquefied
natural gas (LNG) production, and as a result of the increasing effort to
pass the NOPEC legislation. Indonesia has become a net oil importer and
has suspended its membership.
4 ORGANIZATION OF THE PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES, OPEC
Statute, ch.1, art. 2, at 1 (2012),
https://www.opec.org/opec web/static filesproject/media/downloads/publi
cations/OPECStatute.pdf.
5 See Alex Lawler, Amena Bakr & Dmitry Zhdannikov, Inside OPEC
room, Naimi declares price war on U.S. shale oil, REUTERS (November 28,
2014), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-opec-meeting-shale/inside-opec-
room-naimi-declares-price-war-on-u-s-shale-oil-
idUSKCNOJC1GK20141128.
6 See Haynes and Boone, LLP, Oil Patch Bankruptcy Monitor (Jan. 7,
2019), http://www.haynesboone.com/-
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The oil cartel extends beyond OPEC member countries.
As OPEC states, "On 1 January 2017 the 24 OPEC and non-
OPEC oil producing country participants to the Declaration of
Cooperation forged ahead with actions to adjust the total amount
of oil produced by around 1.8 mb/d, in order to speed up the
drawdown of stocks in a flooded market."7 The increase in
coordination between member and non-member countries adds a
new wrinkle to the dynamics of this cartel.
Currently, OPEC controls over 80% of the world's proven
oil reserves. Sixty-five percent of the world's proven oil reserves
are located in OPEC-member countries in the Middle East.'
OPEC member countries produce approximately 40 percent of
the world's crude oil. OPEC member country oil exports
represent about 60 percent of the total petroleum traded
internationally.9
OPEC also uses spare production capacity to manage oil
markets. According to the U.S. Energy Information
Administration (EIA):' 0
The extent to which OPEC member countries utilize
their available production capacity is often used as an
indicator of the tightness of global oil markets, as well
as an indicator of the extent to which OPEC is exerting
upward influence on prices. EIA defines spare capacity
as the volume of production that can be brought on
/media/files/energybankruptcyreports/oilpatch bankruptcy monitor.ashx
?la=en&hash=D2114D98614039A2D2D5A43A61146B1 3387AA3AE;
Current Employment Statistics: Oil and Gas Extraction (NAICS Code 201)
and Support Activities for Oil and Gas Operations (NAICS Code 213112),
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/dsrv?ce; Quarterly
Census of Employment and Wages, Drilling oil and gas wells (NAICS
213111) BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICs, https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/dsrv?en.
7 See ORGANIZATION OF THE PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES,
Declaration of Cooperation, OPEC (Nov. 30, 2017)
https://www.opec.org/opec-web/en/pressroom/4696.htm (the non-OPEC
oil producing countries, led by the Russian Federation, include Azerbaijan,
Kingdom of Bahrain, Brunei Darussalam, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Mexico,
Sultanate of Oman, Republic of Sudan, and Republic of South Sudan).
8 ORGANIZATION OF THE PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES, Share of
world crude oil reserves (2017)
https://www.opec.org/opec web/en/data_graphs/330.htm (last visited June
8, 2019).
9 Id.
10 The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) is the statistical
and analytical agency within the U.S. Department of Energy.
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within 30 days and sustained for at least 90 days. Saudi
Arabia, the largest oil producer within OPEC and the
world's largest oil exporter, historically has had the
greatest spare capacity. Saudi Arabia has usually kept
more than 1.5 - 2 million barrels per day of spare
capacity on hand for market management."
Another key player in the OPEC cartel is the national oil
companies (NOCs). 1 2  NOCs are government-owned and
controlled corporations that engage in the production, processing,
and distribution of hydrocarbons.1 3 According to a 2011 World
Bank report, "[t]oday national oil companies (NOCs) control
approximately 90 percent of the world's oil reserves and 75
percent of production (similar numbers apply to gas), as well as
many of the major oil and gas infrastructure systems." 14 NOCs
often times act as gatekeepers to bar entry from private oil
companies. "[A]n estimated 60 percent of the world's
undiscovered reserves lie in countries where NOCs have
privileged access to reserves."15
B. NOPE C Legislation
NOPEC covers any "foreign state, or any instrumentality
or agent of any foreign state" that acts "collectively or in
combination with any other foreign state, any instrumentality or
agent of any other foreign state, or any other person, whether by
cartel or any other association or form of cooperation or joint
action." 16 This broad language would include OPEC and OPEC
11 U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, What Drives Crude Oil
Prices?, https://www.eia.gov/finance/markets/crudeoil/supply-opec.php
(Last updated Oct. 8, 2019).
12 See ORGANIZATION OF THE PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES, Oil &
Energy Ministries/NOCs, https://www.opec.org/opec-web/en/360.htm (last
visited Oct. 8, 2019) (a.listing of OPEC NOCs can be found here).
13 Such companies are more generally termed "state owned
enterprises" or "SOEs." SOEs have become familiar participants in world
trade.
14 Silvana Tordo et. al, National Oil Companies and Value Creation xi
(World Bank, Working Paper No. 218, 2011),
https://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTOGMC/Resources/9780821388310.
pdf.
15 Id.
16 No Oil Producing and Exporting Cartels Act of 2019, S. 370, 116th
Cong. (2019).
Vol. 32:188
non-member states, NOCs, private companies, and the employees
or agents of any of them.
Under Section 7A(a) of NOPEC, it will be "illegal" for the
covered actors to engage in enumerated actions to fix price and
restrain trade in oil, gas, or other petroleum product markets
when "such action, combination, or collective action has a direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on the market,
supply, price, or distribution of oil, natural gas, or other
petroleum product in the United States."' 7 The bill only targets
concerted action related to manipulation of oil and derivative
markets, not unilateral actions of state actors. Each individual
OPEC country and its SOE remains free to produce as much, or
as little, oil as desired. The legislation only prohibits collective
conduct to fix prices or to otherwise engage in anticompetitive
behavior.
Section 7A(b) of NOPEC seeks to eliminate the
applicability of immunities and exemptions related to coordinated
activity by foreign sovereigns and their agents. Specifically, the
act strikes the applicability of the Act of State, foreign sovereign
compulsion, and political question doctrines by forbidding any
court from considering such doctrines as to the conduct covered
in Section 7A(a).18 These doctrines will be discussed in the next
section.
Under section 7A(c), "sole authority to bring an action to
enforce this section" lies with the Attorney General of the United
States. 19 This would preclude enforcement of NOPEC by the
Federal Trade Commission, private plaintiffs seeking damages,
or State Attorneys General, all of whom are normally able to
enforce federal antitrust laws.
C. Previous Litigation Against OPEC Failed Due to Exemptions
and Immunities
There have been four previous failed attempts to apply
U.S. antitrust law to OPEC. These cases illustrate the difficulties
in suing OPEC and the state owned oil companies and validate
the need for legislation to fix existing law.
The problems faced in the prior cases fall into three
categories: 1) Act of State doctrine and comity concerns 2) service
of process under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA),
7 Id.
8 Id.
19 Id.
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and 3) political question and separation of powers concerns. The
summary of cases that follows describes how these doctrines
interact and work to destroy any potential suit brought against
OPEC, OPEC members, and NOCs.
1. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Org. of the
Petroleum Exporting Countries 20
A labor organization sought to sue OPEC and its member
nations for price fixing under Section 1 of the Sherman Act,
asserting the cartel was a per se violation of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act. The union alleged injury due to "the payment of
higher prices for gasoline at the service station pumps. "21 The
district court dismissed the case against OPEC, holding that
OPEC could not be served under FSIA because OPEC is not a
foreign sovereign. 22 The court then held that, with respect to
member nations, the union members were indirect purchasers
and thus could not sue for treble damages under Illinois Brick.2 3
With respect to injunctive relief, which if granted would have
required OPEC to desist from its collusive conduct, the court
determined that drilling was not subject to the commercial
exception under FSIA because "the nature of the activity engaged
in by each of these OPEC member countries is the establishment
by a sovereign state of the terms and conditions for the removal
of a prime natural resource to wit, crude oil from its territory." 24
. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's
dismissal of the case against OPEC, but on different grounds.
The Court declared that, on the basis of the Act of State doctrine,
"a judicial remedy is inappropriate regardless . . . ."25 The court
held the use of the Act of State doctrine appropriate-though not
compelled-in this case. It reasoned that the "possibility of insult
to the OPEC states and of interference with the efforts of the
political branches to seek favorable relations with them" along
20 -Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Org. of the
Petroleum Exporting Countries, 477 F. Supp. 553 (C.D. Cal.1979).
21 Id. at 559.
22 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2016) (the FSIA has its own service of
process provision).
23 Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977)(holding that indirect
purchasers lack standing to sue under federal antitrust laws).
24 Id.
25 Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Org. of the
Petroleum Exporting Countries, 649 F.2d 1354, 1362 (9th Cir. 1981).
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with there being "no international consensus condemning
cartels," made dismissal under the Act of State doctrine
"appropriate." 2 6 .
2. Prewitt Enters. v. Org. of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 27
Prewitt, an Alabama gasoline station owner, sued OPEC
for violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. It served OPEC by
sending the summons and -complaint via registered mail to
OPEC's headquarters in Austria. The documents were signed
for by OPEC's Human Resource department, which forwarded
the documents on to counsel and OPEC's secretary general.
The court held that service was not valid under Rule
4(f)(2)(C)(ii) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 2 8 which
governs "Service Upon Individuals in a Foreign Country." 29 More
specifically, service by registered mail is permitted under the rule
"unless prohibited by the foreign country's law."30 However, the
Headquarters Agreement between Austria and OPEC contained
a provision stating that service "shall not take place within the
headquarters seat except with the express consent of and under
conditions approved by the Secretary General." 3 1 Thus, because
Austrian law barred service without consent, OPEC was not
effectively served.
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.32 It further considered
whether Rule 4(f)(3) would permit other means of giving actual
notice despite "Austria's direct prohibition of service on OPEC
without its consent."33 The court concluded that such service
would be impermissible, referring to the Advisory Committee
Notes to Rule 4(f)(3). It also concluded that "failure to obtain
OPEC's consent would constitute a substantial affront to
Austrian law."3 4 Thus, without OPEC's consent, OPEC could
not be served.
26 Id. at 1361.
27 Prewitt Enters., Inc. v. Org. of the Petroleum Exporting Countries,
224 F.R.D. 497 (N.D. Ala. 2002).
28 FED. R. CIv. P. 4(f)(2)(C)(ii).
29 Id.
3 0 id.
31 Prewitt Enterprises, Inc. 224 F.R.D. at 500.
32 Prewitt Enters., Inc. v. Org. of the Petroleum Exporting Countries,
353 F.3d 916, 928 (11th Cir. 2003).
3 Id. at 927.
34 id.
2019 NOPEC 91
Loyola Consumer Law Review
3. In re Refined Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation35
This case began as a consolidated complaint that sought
damages and injunctive relief, this time against OPEC and
various NOCs, including Aramco. The district court invoked the
Act of State36 and political question doctrines37 to dismiss the
suits against OPEC and the NOCs.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed.38 The court applied both the
political question and the Act of State doctrines. The court was
convinced "that these matters deeply implicate concerns of
foreign and defense policy." 39 Given "the Executive Branch's
longstanding approach of managing relations with foreign oil-
producing states through diplomacy rather than private
litigation," the court held that the issue was to remain with the
executive branch. 40
35 In re Refined Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 649 F. Supp. 2d 572
(S.D. Tex. 2009).
36 With respect to the Act of State Doctrine, the district court held that
the conduct complained of was "in fact, caused by the production decisions
of the conspiracy's sovereign members" and that "the actions attributed to
the named defendants ... merely facilitate, enable, and assist the foreign
sovereign state members of the conspiracy." This would force the court to
rule on the legality of agreements reached by foreign sovereigns. Thus, the
Act of State doctrine applied. "Decisions of foreign sovereigns about
production levels of natural resources produced within their territorial
boundaries-including crude oil-are sovereign acts regardless of whether
the decisions are products of unilateral deliberation or consultation with
others." Id. at 586-88.
37 With respect to the political question doctrine, one of the factors
involved requires the court to consider "whether it would be possible to
decide this case without expressing a lack of respect for the Executive
Branch's handling of foreign relations." The district court discussed "over
thirty years of public policy statements made by members of the Executive
Branch, all reflecting a commitment to cooperation instead of confrontation
with foreign sovereign oil-producers." Thus, the complaints posed a non-
justiciable political question. Id. at 598.
38 Spectrum Stores, Inc. v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 632 F.3d 938 (5th
Cir. 2011).
39 Id. at 943.
40 Id. at 943.
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4. Freedom Watch, Inc. v. Org. of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries 41
Freedom Watch, a political interest group, brought suit
against OPEC alleging a price fixing conspiracy in violation of
the Sherman and Clayton Acts. The district court granted
OPEC's motion to dismiss for failure to effect valid service
because Freedom Watch's service attempts violated Austrian
law, similar to the reasoning in Prewitt.42 On appeal, the court
vacated the district court's order and sent the case back to the
district court so it could consider whether service on OPEC's
U.S. counsel would constitute service "by other means not
prohibited by international agreement" under Rule 4(f), such that
Freedom Watch could obtain the district court's authorization to
so serve-even if in contravention of Austrian law, provided that
offense is "minimize[d]." 43
On remand, the district court found that the text of Rules
4(h)(2) and 4(f)(3) "provides no authorization for service occurring
within the United States and seems to explicitly forbid such
,service absent federal law to the contrary or waiver. "44 The court
also resurrected the Austrian Headquarters Agreement, stating
that it constituted an "international agreement" that would
prohibit service on OPEC's U.S. counsel under Rule 4(f)(3). 45
Thus, the court denied Freedom Watch's request to authorize
alternative means of service.
D. Previous NOPEC Proposed Legislation4 6
NOPEC legislation has been introduced into Congress no
fewer than twenty-four times since 2000. The language of these
bills has remained substantially unchanged, except for the
enforcement section. The initial bill allowed for enforcement by
the Federal Trade Commission as well as the Department of
41 Freedom Watch, Inc. v. Org. of the Petroleum Exporting Countries,
766 F.3d 74 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
42 Id. at 77.
43 Id. at 83-84.
" Freedom Watch, Inc. v. Org. of Petroleum Exporting Countries, 107
F. Supp. 3d 134, 137 (D.D.C. 2015).
45 Id. at 138.
46 See, e.g. H.R. 948, 116th Cong. (2019); S. 370, 116th Cong. (2019), S. 3214,
115th Cong. (2017); H.R. 5904, 115th Cong. (2017); S. 394, 112th Cong. (2011);
H.R. 1899, 112th Cong. (2011).
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Justice. The Federal Trade Commission's ability to bring action
under the proposed legislation has now been removed.
E. The Problems Remedied by NOPEC
1. Comity
Comity concerns lie behind the issues that NOPEC
addresses, even though NOPEC does not directly mention the
term itself. Comity is a doctrine of international reciprocity.
"Comity itself reflects the broad concept of respect among co-
equal sovereign nations and plays a role in determining the
recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the
legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation." 47 The
Department of Justice weighs several factors: "The existence of a
purpose to affect or an actual effect on U.S.. commerce; the
significance and foreseeability of the effects of the anticompetitive
conduct on the United States; the degree of conflict with a foreign
jurisdiction's law or articulated policy; the extent to which the
enforcement activities of another jurisdiction, including remedies
resulting from those enforcement activities, may be affected; and
the effectiveness of foreign enforcement as compared to U.S.
enforcement." 4 8  The International Guidelines further caution
that "the Agencies consider the extent to which a foreign
sovereign encourages or discourages certain courses of conduct." 49
A DOJ determination that the interests of comity are not
impaired by bringing suit requires some deference if the issue is
raised in court.50 As Judge Wood wrote: "[T]he decision to
prosecute a foreign corporation represents the assessment of the
Executive Branch, through the Department of Justice, that the
proceeding furthers U.S. interests. It is not up to the courts to
monitor the extent of Justice's consultations with the Department
47 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE AND FED. TRADE COMM'N, Antitrust Guidelines
for International Enforcement and Cooperation, 27 (Jan. 13, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/internationalguidelines [hereinafter International
Guidelines] (internal quotations omitted).
48 Id. at 28.
49 Id. at 32.
50 See United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 731 F. Supp. 3, 6 n.5
(D.D.C.) ("The State Department has considered Finland's position, and the
United States has decided to go ahead with the case. It is not the Court's
role to second-guess the executive branch's judgment as to the proper role
of comity concerns under these circumstances."), aff'd, 908 F.2d 981 (D.C.
Cir. 1990).
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of State, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, the
Commerce Department, or any other interested entity, although
we are aware that such consultations often take place." 5 1 Private
litigants cannot give the courts assurance that the interests of
foreign governments have been given adequate attention.
Government litigants can. By giving the power to enforce
NOPEC exclusively to the DOJ, the bill goes far to remove any
concern a court might have as to whether the interests of foreign
sovereigns have been accorded proper weight.
2. Act of State Doctrine
The Act of State doctrine "prevents courts from declaring
invalid the official act of a foreign sovereign performed within its
own territory." 52 According to the International Guidelines, "the
Agencies may exercise enforcement discretion and decline to
challenge foreign acts of state if the facts and circumstances
indicate that: (1) the specific conduct complained of is a public act
of the sovereign, (2) the act was taken within the territorial
jurisdiction of the sovereign, and (3) the conduct relates to a
matter that is governmental, rather than commercial."53
In the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on the
subject,54 the Court addressed a private civil action under the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).
Plaintiffs alleged that a company won a defense contract from the
Nigerian government through bribery, in violation of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act. The district court, seeking guidance from
the Department of State, held that the Act of State doctrine
applied. The Third Circuit reversed, and the Supreme Court
agreed with the reversal.
The Supreme Court addressed the jurisdictional
foundations of the Act of State doctrine: "We have more recently
described [the Act of State doctrine]. . .as a consequence of
domestic separation of powers, reflecting "the strong sense of the
Judicial Branch that its engagement in the task of passing on the
validity of foreign acts of state may hinder" the conduct of foreign
51 United States v. Sinovel Wind Grp Co., 794 F.3d 787, 792 (7th Cir.
2015) (need a "compelling reason ... to override the government's
assessment. . .").
52 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE AND FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 47, at 35.
53 Id.
5 WS. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400
(1990).
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affairs.55
The Court also indicated the doctrine is not one of
abstention: "Courts in the United States have the power, and
ordinarily the obligation, to decide cases and controversies
properly presented to them. The act of state doctrine does not
establish an exception for cases and controversies that may
embarrass foreign governments, but merely requires that, in the
process of deciding, the acts of foreign sovereigns taken within
their own jurisdictions shall be deemed valid."5
It is unclear whether the doctrine would shield state
owned oil companies when they act in concert. It is questionable
whether one could assert that the act of agreeing to restrict output
is an act exclusively undertaken within the territory of the
sovereign in which the state oil company exists, as the Supreme
Court requires. Also, consistent with the exceptions of the FSIA,
the DOJ would likely view the acts of state oil companies as
being commercial activities. Such acts would not be the public
act of the sovereign. NOPEC avoids all these problems, of
course, because NOPEC would forbid courts from raising the
doctrine to bar suit by the DOJ.
3. Foreign Sovereign Compulsion57
When a foreign sovereign compels the very conduct that
the U.S. antitrust laws forbid, private parties may use the Foreign
Sovereign Compulsion defense. To raise the defense, "the foreign
government must have compelled the anticompetitive conduct
under circumstances in which a refusal to comply with the
foreign government's command would give rise to the imposition
of penal or other severe sanctions."58 The conduct must be of the
type that can only accomplished entirely within the foreign
sovereign's own territory. Finally, the compulsion must arise
from a foreign government acting in its official capacity; "The
defense does not arise from conduct that would fall within the
FSIA commercial activity exception."59
66 Id. at 404.
56 Id. at 409.
57 We express no opinion here as to whether any OPEC member
state's law compels any state-owned oil company to act in violation of U.S.
antitrust laws.
58 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE AND FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note
47, at 33.
59 Id.
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Even without NOPEC's prohibition against use of the
doctrine to bar a DOJ suit, it is difficult to see a circumstance
where the doctrine would apply. 60 To date, the only known case
where the defense has been accepted is Interamerican Refining
Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc.61 More recent cases, in seeming
agreement with the International Guidelines, tend to require
greater levels of proof of actual compulsion, rather than a mere
suggestion. 62
4. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
The sole basis for determining jurisdiction in a civil case
in a U.S. court over a defendant that is a foreign state or
instrumentality is the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA).63 Apart from enumerated exceptions and treaties, the
FSIA shields foreign states from civil jurisdiction in U.S. courts. 64
As the International Guidelines point out, the most
60 Spencer Weber Waller, Suing OPEC, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 105, 134
(2002) (noting doctrine successful only once "and has been otherwise
rejected in each case because the court determined that the defendants
acted pursuant to the advice, encouragement, or prodding of a foreign
government but had not been subject to outright compulsion.").
61 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970).
62 See JEFFREY L. KESSLER & SPENCER WEBER WALLER, INTERNATIONAL
TRADE AND U.S. ANTITRUST LAW §11.10 (2d ed. 2018) ("[S]ome courts have
been reluctant to apply the foreign compulsion defense in seemingly similar
situations. The frequent failure of the defense has resulted from a judicial
insistence on the presence of actual compulsion as a requirement for
immunity. Knowledge, acquiescence, approval, participation, or even
encouragement of the unlawful restraint by a foreign government is
insufficient to provide immunity for a private firm violating the antitrust
laws."). See also Animal Science Prods., Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm.
Co., 138 S. Ct. 1865, 1875 (2018)(foreign country's interpretation of its
domestic law not binding); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764,
801 (1993)(requiring actual compulsion for foreign sovereign compulsion
defense).
63 See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1330 et.
seq. (2019).
6 The exceptions include: waived immunity explicitly or by implication;
engaged in commercial activity; expropriated property in violation of
international law; acquired rights to property in the United States; committed
certain torts within the United States; or agreed to arbitration of the dispute.
See Foreign Cultural Exchange Jurisdictional Immunity Clarification Act of
2016, 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2019).
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relevant exception is for "commercial activity." 65 Under the
FSIA, "commercial activity" is defined to include "either a regular
course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial
transaction or act." 66 The International Guidelines indicate that
with respect to state actors, the principal question is whether the
government is acting "not as a regulator of a market, but in the
manner of a private player within it." 6 7
The International Guidelines firmly lead to the conclusion
that state oil companies fall within the commercial exception: "As
a practical matter, most activities of foreign state-owned
enterprises operating in the commercial marketplace are
'commercial' and, therefore, such enterprises are not immune
from the jurisdiction of the U.S. courts in actions to enforce the
antitrust laws by virtue of the FSIA. The commercial activities of
these enterprises are subject to the U.S. antitrust laws to the same
extent as the activities of privately owned foreign firms." 68
NOPEC makes it unnecessary to resolve the question
whether the commercial exception applies to the conduct of state
oil companies involved in a combination to restrain trade in oil
and oil products. Under Section 3 of NOPEC, civil suits brought
under NOPEC are expressly made a separate exception to the
FSIA, thereby allowing such suits to proceed in federal court.69
NOPEC Is CONSISTENT WITH U.S. ANTITRUST POLICY
A. U.S. Justice Department Enforcement Policy
Price fixing cartels have been condemned as violating the
Sherman Act virtually since the passage of the statute in 1890.70
65 A foreign state is not immune from an action brought in any court in
the United States in any case ". . in which the action is based upon a
commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or
upon an act performed in the United States in connection with a commercial
activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of
the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign
state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States."
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE AND FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 47, at 30-31.
66 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (2019).
67 Id.
6 Id.
69 No Oil Producing and Exporting Cartels Act of 2019, supra note 16, at
Sec. 3.
70 See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir.
1898) (cartel of cast iron soil pipe manufacturers) (Taft, J.), affd, 175 U.S.
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The prohibition was crystalized in a 1940 Supreme Court
decision involving the criminal prosecution of the major oil
companies for agreements restricting the output of gasoline:
"Under the Sherman Act a combination formed for the purpose
and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or
stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign
commerce is illegal per se." 71
The condemnation of cartels has applied to international
cartels as well as domestic cartels. The DOJ's enforcement of the
Sherman Act against international cartels began at the turn of the
twentieth century when it brought criminal and civil cases
against the American Tobacco Co. and two English companies
for dividing world cigarette markets.72 In the period leading up
to World War II, the DOJ further intensified its enforcement
efforts against international cartels. Between 1939 and 1943 it
brought approximately thirty cases against U.S. and non-U.S.
companies involved in international trade, in industries from
synthetic rubber to potash to pharmaceuticals to titanium,
including a criminal case against Standard Oil for conspiring
with I.G. Farben to restrain trade in petroleum products and
chemicals.73
The strongest and most consistent effort to stop
international cartels, however, began in the 1990s and continues
today.74 Recent criminal prosecutions of international cartels
have ranged from automobile parts, to financial services, to
dynamic random access memory chips to liquid crystal displays
(LCDs). In the auto parts prosecutions alone, more than thirty
non-U.S. corporations have been convicted for fixing the prices of
more than twenty different auto parts, ranging from brake hoses
to spark plugs to seatbelts.75
211 (1899).
71 United States v. Socony -Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
72 See United States v. American Tob. Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
73 See Harry First, The Vitamins Case: Cartel Prosecutions and the
Coming of International Competition Law, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 711, 728-30
(2001).
74 In 1993 the Justice Department reported 25 grand juries
investigating international cartels; in 2018 there were 91 open grand jury
investigations. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Division Update Spring 2019
(2019), https:// www.justice.gov/atr/division-operations/division-update-
spring-2019/cartels-beware (numbers do not indicate how many of these
investigations involve domestic cartels).
75 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Division Update Spring 2015 (2015),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/division-update/2015/criminal-program-update.
2019 NOPEC 99
Loyola Consumer Law Review
B. Territorial Reach of U.S. Antitrust Law
Although early cases cast doubt on the extent to which the
U.S. antitrust laws extended to conduct that took place outside
the territorial borders of the United States, the Alcoa decision in
1945 made clear that conduct that occurred abroad but was
intended to affect, and did affect, U.S. commerce came within the
prohibitions of the Sherman Act.76 Most countries have
subsequently adopted some version of this "effects" doctrine to
reach cartel activity that occurs abroad but affects their markets.
The result has been an increasing international effort to stop
cartel activity wherever it occurs.
Despite this general agreement over cartel policy and the
territorial reach of competition law, conflicts have arisen with
countries that might prefer to shield their domestic companies
from U.S. antitrust liability. As discussed above, this has led to
the development of various U.S. doctrines designed to mediate
these conflicts under an overall concept of "comity," as well as to
some early attempts by foreign countries to block private lawsuits
under U.S. antitrust law (discussed below). Congress also passed
the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA) in 1984.
This statute amended the antitrust laws to limit their coverage for
conduct that occurs abroad unless that conduct has a "direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" on U.S. domestic
commerce,7 7 language that NOPEC replicates.
The FTAIA has reduced the ability of private parties to
recover damages for conduct that occurs abroad 78 but it has not
affected the ability of the DOJ to prosecute international cartels
that affect U.S. markets. For example, in the litigation over the
price fixing of LCDs for consumer electronics, one court
interpreted the FTAIA to restrict the private litigants but not the
DOJ7 9 and another found there was sufficient effect on direct
imports of consumer electronics with price fixed LCDs to satisfy
Section 1 for a criminal prosecution without regard to whether
76 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir.
1945).
77 See Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 6a (West 2019).
78 See F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155
(2004) (foreign purchasers of vitamins).
79 See Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 775 F. 3d 816,
825-26 (7th Cir. 2014) (distinguishing between private litigation and
government enforcement under the FTAIA) (Posner, J.).
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the effects on domestic U.S. commerce met the "direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable" test of the FTAIA.80
The willingness of the courts to reach conduct that a
foreign sovereign might prefer to shield from liability was
recently shown in the litigation involving the Chinese Vitamin C
cartel.81 There, the Supreme Court unanimously held that the
views of a foreign government on whether its domestic producers
were legally required to engage in a price fixing cartel were not
entitled to absolute deference. The court of appeals previously
held the Chinese Ministry's views on Chinese law were binding
on it, but the Supreme Court disagreed: "[T]he appropriate
weight in each case will depend upon the circumstances; a federal
court is neither bound to adopt the foreign government's
characterization nor required to ignore other relevant
materials." 82 U.S. policy to deter international cartels will not be
so easily evaded.
C. Conclusion
The U.S. government's unwillingness to prosecute the
members of the OPEC cartel has been inconsistent with the
general policy that the U.S. government has vigorously followed
since the mid-1990s with regard to international cartels that harm
U.S. consumers and markets. NOPEC now provides the DOJ
with the opportunity to make its enforcement policies consistent
with regard to all industries and all defendants.
THE DOJ RETAINS DISCRETION IN ENFORCING
NOPEC
A. The DOJ's Enforcement Choices
1. General Choices
NOPEC creates a new substantive antitrust prohibition in
addition to Section 1 of the Sherman Act. As a normal matter,
Section 1's prohibition on "contracts, combinations, or
80 See United States v. Hui Hsiung, 758 F.3d 1074, 1094 (9th Cir.
2014).
81 See Animal Sci. Prods. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct.
1865 (2018).
82 Id. at 1873.
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conspiracies in restraint of trade"8 3 can be enforced by multiple
parties - the DOJ, the Federal Trade Commission (through
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act), private parties
(suing for monetary and injunctive relief), and State Attorneys
General suing on behalf of their citizens. By contrast, NOPEC's
Section 7A(a)'s prohibition on acting "collectively or in
combination" to limit production of petroleum products, or to set
their price, can be enforced only by the DOJ.8 4
Like any other antitrust law, the DOJ could enforce
NOPEC in three different ways- criminal prosecution, civil
proceeding for injunctive relief, and a civil suit for treble the
damages the United States has suffered as a result of the violation
of NOPEC.s5 These are not mutually exclusive, although the
Department might choose not to pursue all of them.
2. Criminal Enforcement
As indicated above, the DOJ has been following a
vigorous program of criminal enforcement against international
cartels, involving prosecutions of corporate entities and their
employees. Should the DOJ pursue criminal prosecution, it could
choose to indict any of the parties enumerated in Section 7A(a),
that is, foreign states or instrumentalities or "any other person"
involved in the joint action. Under the Sherman Act and general
federal law, "person" includes individuals and associations (e.g.,
corporations and partnerships). 8 6  Thus, a prosecution could
include individuals who work for any of the entities being
prosecuted, as well as non-sovereign entities, whether formed in
the United States or elsewhere, that participate in the
combination. Individuals can be prosecuted and punished even if
they are citizens of countries other than the United States.87
83 Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890).
84 No Oil Producing and Exporting Cartels Act of 2019, supra note 16, at
Sec. 7(A).
85 We confine our analysis to suits under NOPEC. There is nothing in
NOPEC, however, that makes it the exclusive remedy for antitrust violations
involving petroleum products. Thus, the DOJ could still choose to proceed
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act if it thought that would be preferable.
86 See 15 U.S.C. § 7. The Supreme Court has held that a foreign state
can be a "person" for purposes of the Sherman Act, see Pfizer, Inc. v. Gov't
of India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978) (suit for damages).
87 See Scott D. Hammond, Dep'ty Ass't Attny Gen'l for Criminal
Enforcement, Antitrust Div. U.S. Dep't of Justice, The Evolution of Criminal
Antitrust Enforcement Over the Last Two Decades 7-10 (Feb. 25, 2010),
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The penalties for a criminal violation of the antitrust laws
are fines and imprisonment.88  The maximum fine for a
corporation is the alternative of $100 million or twice the gain or
loss from the violation.89 The maximum penalties for individuals
are a $1 million fine (or twice the gain or loss) and ten years in
jail.
Within these maxima, actual penalties for specific
antitrust violations are determined through application of the
United States Sentencing Guidelines. Fines depend on a number
of factors, including various indicia of culpability, but have
generally focused on the amount of overcharge for the price fixed
product.90 These fines can be substantial.91 Jail sentences are
based primarily on the volume of commerce for the affected
goods done by an individual's employer. 92 The average annual
sentence of imprisonment in the five-year period from 2014 to
2019 has ranged from a high of 26 months to a low of 9 months. 9 3
3. Civil Enforcement
The DOJ has chosen to bring criminal prosecutions only
for those antitrust conspiracies that involve "hard core" price
fixing and bid rigging. Other violations of Section 1, such as
tying or exclusive dealing contracts, are pursued as civil matters,
although, on occasion, the DOJ will prosecute price fixing
agreements civilly rather than criminally.94 If a case is brought
https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/518241/download (discussing prosecution of
individuals, including foreign nationals).
88 Restitution is also possible as part of a plea agreement or condition
of probation. The DOJ has obtained orders of restitution in some criminal
cases, although it does not frequently seek them. We note that the bill does
not specify the penalties for violating Section 7A. We are assuming that the
drafters expect the penalty provisions for a Section 1 violation to apply to a
Section 7A violation. It would be helpful if the bill clarified this point.
8 See 15 U.S.C. § 1; 18 U.S.C. § 3571 (d) (alternative fine).
90 See Hui Hsiung, 758 F. 3d at 1095 (gross gains is the "additional
revenue to the conspirators from the conspiracy") (affirming $500 million
corporate fine).
91 See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Div., Sherman Act Violations
Yielding A Corporate Fine of $10 (144 fines in excess of $10 million).
92 See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2R1.1 (U.S. Sentencing
Comm'n 2004).
93 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Antitrust Div. Workload Statistics FY
2008-2017, 13 (2018), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/788426/download.
9 See United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2015)
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civilly, the remedy is an injunction against engaging in the
behavior in the future. Failure to comply with the injunction
may result in either civil or criminal contempt proceedings, which
can raise enforcement issues of their own. There are no fines for
a civil violation of the antitrust laws.
The DOJ has unreviewable discretion with regard to
proceeding civilly. It might choose to do so in a NOPEC case, for
example, if it felt that it could more easily meet the lower burden
of proof for civil cases (proof by a preponderance of the evidence
rather than beyond a reasonable doubt) or if it felt that the
defendants had some foreign policy argument against imposing
criminal liability or if it believed that it could only sue state
owned companies civilly (discussed below"s). If the DOJ did
proceed with a civil suit, however, it might lose the incentives
that its criminal amnesty program provides to cartel participants
who seek amnesty from criminal prosecution in exchange for
cooperating with the DOJ in the investigation. It would also
have a weaker remedy to apply.
4. Suits for Damages to the United States
Section 4A of the Clayton Act gives the DOJ the right to
sue for three times the damages to its "business or property"
caused by a violation of the antitrust laws. 96 No doubt the
United States government purchases large amounts of gasoline
and petroleum products; at least in theory, this provision could
provide U.S. taxpayers with substantial relief from any
overcharges that the government has incurred within the statute
of limitations period.
There are at least two important obstacles to bringing a
successful Section 4A suit. For one, only those who have
purchased directly from price fixers can bring antitrust damages
suits. To the extent that any agreements on price or output were
effected at the production level, the U.S. government would be
able to sue only for sales made directly to it at that level, not to
purchases made from refiners or downstream distributors. For
another, proving the "but for" price in this market might be
difficult. The government does not have to make this proof in a
criminal prosecution or in a civil case seeking an injunction, but
(ebooks price fixing conspiracy).
95 See infra text accompanying notes 105-111.
96 15 U.S.C. § 15a.
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it would if it were asking for damages.
Although as a historical matter Section 4A has rarely been
enforced, in 2018 the DOJ announced a settlement of a Section
4A case in connection with bid rigging of fuel contracts to the
U.S. military in Korea. 97 Despite this recent case, we believe that
the legal issues in suing oil producers for damages makes a
Section 4A suit for damages unlikely.
B. Special Enforcement Problems in Suing Oil Producers Under
NOPEC
1. Enforcement of Judgments
Some critics of the NOPEC legislation suggest it would be
difficult to enforce a judgment under Section 7A(a), raising the
possibility that the U.S. would need to seize foreign investments
in the United States, "particularly in the refining sector."98 It is
difficult to see why the DOJ would need to resort to such extreme
measures or why the "refining sector" would have particular
problems. True, potential criminal fines might be substantial,
but these are not levied until the conclusion of a criminal
proceeding at which the defendant has appeared and defended
itself. The DOJ does not appear to have problems obtaining
payment of criminal fines in other antitrust cases involving
foreign and domestic companies without resorting to seizure of
assets. We do- not see why this sector should be any different.
Civil litigation would only be for injunctive relief, not damages;
enforcement of the injunction through a seizure of property seems
quite unlikely.
2. Retaliation
a. Legislative Retaliation
Prior to the 1980s, in some instances in which the U.S. has
enforced its antitrust laws against foreign cartels, U.S. trading
97 See Makan Delrahim, Ass't Attny Gen'l, Antitrust Div. U.S. Dep't of
Justice, November Rain: Antitrust Enforcement on Behalf of American
Consumers and Taxpayers 6-7 (Nov. 15, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/l 111651/download.
98 See Lucian Pugliaresi, NOPEC Oil Nonsense, REAL CLEAR ENERGY(March 20 2019),
https://realclearenergy.org/articles/2019/03/20/nopecoilnonsense.html.
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partners enacted legislation blocking discovery and permitting
defendants to "claw back" the treble-damages portion of any
private recovery that might be awarded by a U.S. court.99 The
effect of the statutes was limited, in part due to lax antitrust
enforcement in the 1980s and increased harmonization of
antitrust efforts in recent decades as many foreign countries
(particularly in Europe) came to appreciate the value of antitrust
law and enforcement.
b. Financial Retaliation
Antitrust enforcement against state oil companies might
also become part of a larger set of trade disputes and tariff
retaliations. As the George W. Bush administration stated in its
opposition to the bill in 2007, "[t]his would result in a targeting of
foreign direct investment in the United States. as a source of
damage awards and would likely spur retaliatory action against
American interests in those countries and lead to a reduction in
oil available to U.S. refiners." 1a However, this type of retaliation
seems unlikely. As noted above, the DOJ likely will not be
seeking any damages, so there would be no "damages awards" to
enforce. Regardless, even in the most drastic and overstated of
scenarios, the U.S. of course could respond in kind to actions
seeking to circumvent the functioning of markets and antitrust
enforcement.
The U.S. ability to counter output limits from OPEC
countries stands in some contrast to the situation in earlier times.
Of course, the most prominent example of OPEC restricting oil to
the U.S. is the oil embargo in the 1970s. As described on the U.S.
Government's Office of the Historian site, "[t]he price of oil per
barrel first doubled, then quadrupled, imposing skyrocketing
costs on consumers and structural challenges to the stability of
9 Harry First, The Vitamins Case: Cartel Prosecutions and the Coming
of International Competition Law, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 711 (2001). See also
Donald J. Curotto, Comment, Extraterritorial Application of the Antitrust
Laws and Retaliatory Legislation by Foreign Countries, 11 GOLDEN GATE U.
L. REV. 577(1981).
100 OFFICE OF MGMT. & AND BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
Statement of Administration Policy H.R.. 2264 - no oil producing and
exporting cartels act of 2007 (NOPEC) (2007),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/assets/OMB/leg
islative/sap/110-1/hr2264sap-h.pdf.
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whole national economies."' 0 ' Lack of a supply response allowed
for oil prices to escalate unchecked and shortages to commence.
Today, the U.S. is the largest producer of oil in the world.1 0 2
Thus, a price increase or output restriction would precipitate
substantial supply responses from U.S. producers. .
As for some form of asymmetric retaliation against U.S.
assets in OPEC countries, it is worth noting that even when
private parties were trying to sue OPEC, with the potential for
large damages awards, the OPEC countries did not engage in
retaliation. Instead, they hired lawyers to fight the litigation
(successfully) in federal court.103
3. Procedural Problems
As noted above, the Prewitt and Freedom Watch cases
foundered on the plaintiffs' inability to serve OPEC. The
NOPEC legislation does not address the procedural problem
involved in those cases. It may very well be, however, that the
DOJ will be able to avoid the litigation problems that the private
civil plaintiffs encountered, for example, by proceeding criminally
where different service rules apply, or by not charging OPEC at
all.1 04 Accordingly, the NOPEC bill need not address these
procedural issues.
4. Jurisdictional Problems
A more serious concern is whether foreign sovereigns or
their instrumentalities (SOEs) can be criminally prosecuted for
101 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, Oil Embargo
Milestones 1969-1976, Oil Embargo 1973-1974 (2016),
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1 969-1976/oil-embargo.
102 See U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, March 2019
Monthly Energy Review, Figure 11.1A: World Crude Oil Production
Overview https://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/pdf/merg.pdf.
103 We note that in the International Association of Machinists litigation,
discussed above, OPEC and its member states were represented on
appeal by Antonin Scalia, then a professor at the University of Chicago Law
School. See Int'l Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. The Org.
of the Petroleum Exporting Companies (OPEC), 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir.
1981).
104 See In re Pangang Grp. Co., 901 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2018)(indictment of Chinese government SOE for violating Economic Espionage
Act; service on counsel upheld under FR Crim P Rule 4) (denying
mandamus petition).
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violating Section 7A(a). The NOPEC bill would remove
immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)
for Section 7A(a) violations, but the FSIA covers civil suits.1 0 5
Does the FSIA's failure to cover criminal suits against foreign
sovereigns or their instrumentalities mean that such entities are
immune from criminal prosecution or are they simply outside the
scope of the FSIA?
There are few lower court decisions on this issue and no
Supreme Court decision directly on point. 106 The D.C. Circuit,
however, recently held that a grand jury subpoena is enforceable
against an SOE. 0 7 The Court of Appeals first compared the
broad statutory language conferring district court jurisdiction in
criminal cases to the FSIA's provision conferring limited
jurisdiction over certain civil claims.108 Deciding that the FSIA
left intact the district court's broad criminal jurisdiction, the
Court of Appeals simply applied the FSIA's substantive
exemption from immunity for commercial activity. The court
pointed out that the FSIA sought to ensure, that foreign
sovereigns would not be immune from liability for their
commercial activities. To read the FSIA as immunizing criminal
activity would mean that "a foreign-sovereign-owned, purely
commercial enterprise operating within the United States could
flagrantly violate criminal laws and the U.S. government would
be powerless to respond save through diplomatic pressure. ... We
doubt very much that Congress so dramatically gutted the
government's crime-fighting toolkit." 109
105 See 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (a) ("The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction . . . of any nonjury civil action against a foreign state."). See
also International Guidelines § 4.2.1 (FSIA shields foreign states "from the
civil jurisdiction" of U.S. courts).
106 For lower court decisions, compare Keller v. Central Bank of
Nigeria, 277 F. 3d 811, 820 (6th Cir. 2002) (foreign sovereign cannot be
indicted for criminal predicate offense under RICO) (civil case) with In re
Grand Jury Proceeding Related to M/V Deltuva, 752 F. Supp. 2d 173, 179-
80 (D. P.R. 2010) (FSIA does not apply to criminal cases) (denying motion
to quash grand jury subpoena directed at Lithuanian SOE). See also
Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 323 (2010) (FSIA does not apply to
immunity claims of foreign government officials; this' was "not the particular
problem to which Congress was responding when it enacted the FSIA").
107 In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 912 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2019), cert.
denied, 139 S.Ct. 1378 (March 25, 2019).
108 See 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (district courts have original jurisdiction "of all
offenses against the laws of the United States").
109 In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 912 F.3d at 630.
Vol. 32:1108
The D.C. Circuit's position is consistent with government
practice outside the antitrust area.1"o As the Solicitor General told
the Supreme Court in that case, "the United States has not
understood government-owned businesses to be immune from
criminal prosecution." 11 The position of the D.C. Circuit and the
Solicitor General produces a sensible result in a NOPEC
prosecution against an SOE. In passing this statute, Congress
should not be seen as leaving the DOJ to the weak civil law
remedies the antitrust laws provide. Criminal enforcement of the
antitrust laws should be in the DOJ's "toolkit," subject to the
exercise of its discretion.
C. Conclusion
NOPEC is a relatively moderate measure by virtue of its
not exposing participants in the oil cartel to the full panoply of
enforcement that the antitrust laws ordinarily provide. Private
litigation opens up the possibility of large damages judgments, or
even default judgments. When it comes to government litigation
by the DOJ, however, different remedy. choices and different
interests come into play. Governments around the world have
reached an accommodation with the DOJ's criminal enforcement,
even as they may still be concerned about private plaintiffs. We
do not foresee retaliation for the DOJ's international cartel
enforcement and we would not expect to see it if the DOJ
determines, after internal consultation, that litigation is
appropriate.
Moderation, of course, is not weakness. Should the DOJ
choose to pursue criminal remedies, significant penalties will be
possible. Past experience with international cartels where
participants face significant liability shows a race to the DOJ to
offer substantial assistance in return for leniency. We would
110 See, e.g., United States v. United Microelectronics Corp., No. 18-cr-
465 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (charging theft of trade secrets by Chinese
government SOE). See also In Re Grand Jury Subpoena, Brief for the
United States in Opposition, No. 18-948, at 18 (Feb. 2019) (asserting
"decades of practice under which the United States has prosecuted and
served criminal process on commercial enterprises that are majority-owned
by foreign governments") (citing cases including United States v. Statoil,
ASA, No. 06-cr-960, S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 2006, a criminal information and
deferred prosecution agreement against Norwegian state-owned oil
company).
111 In Re Grand Jury Subpoena, Brief for the United States in
Opposition, supra note 107, at 23.
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expect similar actions should NOPEC be enacted into law and
the DOJ begins its consideration of bringing a prosecution under
it.
CONCLUSION
NOPEC is an important part of a worldwide effort to stop
international cartels that harm consumers and reduce economic
welfare. The United States has been in the forefront of this effort,
but it is no longer the only country involved in this type of
enforcement. Passage of NOPEC -reinforces the U.S.
commitment to apply competition law carefully but fully, a
commitment that we want other countries to follow as well.
Makan Delrahim, the current head of the DOJ's Antitrust
Division, wrote the following nearly fifteen years ago:"I2
The task for antitrust practitioners, including those of
us in the government, and for the courts, is to manage
the application of U.S. antitrust law to the shrinking
economic world. On the one hand, we need to maintain
vigorous enforcement when anticompetitive conduct,
whether domestic or foreign, harms U.S. commerce and
U.S. consumers. That enforcement should not be
frustrated by statutory misinterpretations that create
loopholes for cartels and other antitrust violators to
exploit. On the other hand, the U.S. should not be the
world's antitrust police, nor our courts the world's
courts. When antitrust claims do not arise from effects
on U.S. commerce, or when the effects on U.S.
commerce are de minimis or remote, we must respect
the antitrust regimes of other countries and the policy
choices that these (typically democratic) countries have
made.
NOPEC closes "loopholes" that the oil cartelists exploit.
By removing the roadblocks created by past judicial decisions,
the bill provides Congressional permission to the DOJ to act
against the oil cartel, a cartel that has had substantial effects on
U.S. commerce for many decades. If NOPEC were enacted, it
would still be up to the DOJ to decide how to proceed.
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116th CONGRESS, 1st Session
United States Library of Congress
S.370*
Introduced in Senate
February 7, 2019
S.370
To amend the Sherman Act to make oil-producing and exporting
cartels illegal.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
February 7, 2019
Mr. Grassley (for himself, Ms. Klobuchar, Mr. Lee, and Mr.
Leahy) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and
referred to the Committee on the Judiciary:
A BILL
To amend the Sherman Act to make oil-producing and exporting
cartels illegal.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled.
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the 'No Oil Producing and Exporting
Cartels Act of 2019' or 'NOPEC'.
SEC. 2. SHERMAN ACT.
The Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. 1 et seq.) is amended by adding after
section 7 the following:
* The House bill, H.R. 948, is virtually identical except for some
differences in punctuation.
112 Vol. 32:1
NOPEC
'SEC. 7A. OIL PRODUCING CARTELS.
'(a) In General. It shall be illegal and a violation of this Act for
any foreign state, or any instrumentality or agent of any foreign
state, to act collectively or in combination with any other foreign
state, any instrumentality or agent of any other foreign state, or
any other person, whether by cartel or any other association or
form of cooperation or joint action-
'(1) to limit the production or distribution of oil, natural gas,
or any other petroleum product;
'(2) to set or maintain the price of oil, natural gas, or any
petroleum product; or
'(3) to otherwise take any action in restraint of trade for oil,
natural gas, or any petroleum product, when such action,
combination, or collective action has a direct, substantial, and
reasonably foreseeable effect on the market, supply, price, or
distribution of oil, natural gas, or other petroleum product in the
United States.
'(b) Inapplicability of Defenses. No court of the United States
shall decline, based on the act of state, foreign sovereign
compulsion, or political question doctrine to make a
determination on the merits in an action brought under this
section.
'(c) Enforcement. The Attorney General of the United States shall
have the sole authority to bring an action to enforce this section.
Any such action shall be brought in any district court of the
United States as provided under the antitrust laws.'.
SEC. 3. NO SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN OIL CARTEL
CASES.
Title 28, United States Code, is amended-
(1) in section 1605(a)-
(A) in paragraph (5), by striking 'or' after the semicolon;
2019 113
Loyola Consumer Law Review
(B) in paragraph (6), by striking the period and inserting ';
or'; and
(C) by adding at the end the following: '(7) in which the
action is brought under section 7A of the Sherman Act.'; and
(2) in section 1610(a)-
(A) in paragraph (7) by striking the period at the end and
inserting ', or'; and
(B) by adding at the end the following: '(8) the judgment
relates to a claim that is brought under section 7A of the Sherman
Act.'.
SEC. 4. SEVERABILITY.
If any provision of this Act (or of an amendment made by this
Act) is held invalid the remainder of this Act (or of the
amendment) shall not be affected thereby.
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